

## ON THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM IN MALAYA

All socialist thinking in Malaya has always disregarded the problems posed by the Malayan population and is continuing to do so. My whole proposition is that the problems posed by the racial distribution of our population cannot be solved or even understood within the patterns or categories evolved by foreign socialist thinkers or by the experiences of foreign socialist movements. To go on mouthing imported slogans without examining their relevance to the Malaysian situation is not only futile, but also dangerous.

The presence of two large communities of almost equal numbers pose - for socialists - problems of national unity which cannot be treated by the accepted remedies. The accepted remedy advocated by socialists in situations where foreign capital dominates is to rally all classes and peoples against foreign capital, and in the process, achieve independence, and at the same time, the opportunity to embark on the building of a socialist society.

This has been the classical scheme of things. In a modified form, it has been successful in India and in China. It has been the core of socialist thinking in Malaya for both communists and democratic socialists. With the transfer of political power in the Federation, even on these terms, a new situation has been brought into being. But instead of taking stock of the situation, socialists have brushed off the new situation by saying "political power without economic power is an illusion." For realists, illusions have no value, and all socialists are 'realists', and therefore, they have decided to act as though nothing significant has happened.

In a way, they are right. The new situation has not made the old analysis wrong, for it has been wrong all the while. But what is surprising is that even under the impact of the new situation, we socialists have not thought it worth our while to examine the causes of our failure. The failure of our old ideas to find a strong positive response among the Malays who form half the population and the majority of the electorate has to be examined.

Before I proceed any further I may as well state that in my opinion, there can be no change of political power in any form unless such a change has the support of the majority of the Malays. That is, no *coup d'état* by the other communities and no revolution based upon the support of Indians and Chinese, however non-communal its aims may be, can be effective. Such attempts will only lead to a civil war, which will, though it may be fought for ideological reasons, in effect be a war between the two major communities. Consequently, with the transfer of political power to a predominantly Malay electorate, all stable political changes will have to be constitutional. This idea underlies my whole case for a re-assessment of socialist

thinking. It is also one of the reasons for my belief that socialism in Malaya will have to be democratic and parliamentary in form if it is not to engender a civil war.

In view of the fact that socialist thinking in Malaya is classical in origin, it may be worthwhile to examine whether the situation in Malaya satisfies the 'classical' conditions. The theory of uniting all classes and races in a struggle for independence rests on, I think, the hypothesis that exploitation by foreign capital is so pervasive that it encompasses, in its ambit, all classes and races. That it engenders antagonism among all classes and races against it, and that it provides the best rallying point for the widest section of the population is assumed. It also assumes that this antagonism is greater than the antagonism that may exist between these classes and races. Thus, the applicability of the classical theory to Malaya depends on whether all the classes and races are antagonistic to British capital, and whether there is an inherent unity among the races that live in the country; and if there is, whether this inherent unity is greater than the disunity resulting from inter-group exploitation and cultural differences.

On the question of the groups that are exploited by European capital, the important fact that the vast majority of the Malays do not come into the exploiter-exploited relationship with European capital seems to have been disregarded by Malayan socialists. The fact that European capital dominates the economy does not mean it exploits Malay, Indian and Chinese workers and peasants more or less alike. Our economy has a peculiar occupational distribution which seems to follow communal lines. The vast majority of the people employed in the capitalist sector are Indians and Chinese. They form the bulk of the 'conscious proletariat.' The bulk of the Malays are subsistence farmers. That is why foreign capital is really a rallying point for Indians and Chinese only. The theory of a 'unity-of-all-races' is founded on a wrong understanding of the position of Western capital in Malaya.

As for the unity between classes, it is important to recognise that local capitalists, as a class, are not 'national bourgeoisie', at least not as the term is usually understood. The vast majority of our capitalists are traders who depend on foreign firms for their trade. Many of them are in no better position than that of agents of big European firms. There is no doubt that they would like to replace the European firms. This desire is subordinated to the fact that their continued prosperity depends on their association with these European firms. To put it in socialist jargon, there is no sharpened antagonism between this class and foreign capital. They are the compradores, and, as such, a non-revolutionary class.

But you might say there must be some Malayan capitalists who come within the usual definition of 'national bourgeoisie', and what about them? I would say that there are a good many. But even these do not find the presence of foreign capital detrimental to their growth. European capital in Malaya has not

sought to transform itself into industrial capital. It has remained more or less limited to plantations, mines and to commerce. And so, it does not block, to any significant extent, the growth of local capital in industries. In fact, there does not seem to be any pressure to invest capital in manufacturing and the like. Neither foreign nor local capital seems to be interested in these fields. Whatever development there has been in this field has become an area of co-operation, not an area of conflict between local and foreign capital. One has only to look at the share registers of 'European' companies to realise the extent of the co-operation. The political expression of this is to be seen in the attitude of the liberal socialists. Unlike the spokesmen of the Indian national *bourgeoisie*, the Liberal Socialists have often been the spokesmen for the interests of foreign capital. This is not because they are individual 'stooges' of the Europeans, as some would have us believe, but because they express a vital relationship that exists between foreign and local capital in Malaya.

So much for the economic misconception that underlies the theory of the unity of all classes and races against foreign capital. However, economic analysis cannot tell the whole story. Socialists, in trying to analyse the Malayan situation in economic terms, have been guilty of blurring over unpleasant problems and avoiding many critical factors important for the achievement of national unity. Even the position of capitalists in politics cannot be determined by economic interests alone. The nationalist sentiments that are sweeping through the continent of Asia are not based purely on cash calculations, even though cash has an important place. In India and China, race, nationality, history, religion, and even Western education have contributed to unity and solidarity. Though in India, the nationalities were Hindu Muslim, India illustrated the complexity of the forces that make for unity, and possible variations of the concept of the nation.

In Malaya, the position is even more complex. In the first instance, we are, as yet, a communally fragmented people with neither history nor traditions which can generate emotional factors that would make for unity despite the fact that no common economic interests exist. Our capitalists can afford to be guided by purely cash interests, as most of us are still emotionally a part of the countries of our origin. In Malaya, the forces for communal solidarity are stronger than those for national solidarity. But it is doubtful whether even this solidarity is strong enough for local capitalists to identify themselves even with the political movements of people of their own community, if such movements militate against their economic interests. The historic factors that united all the classes of the Indian nation and all the classes of the Muslim nation (Pakistan) are absent in Malaya. Even more important than the emotional reasons that contributed to the unity of all classes and groups in India was the fact that the capitalist and landlord classes were confident of establishing a hegemony over the political movements.

Thus in Malaya, we have a situation where economic, historical, and power factors are such that capitalists are repelled not only by national solidarity but also by communal unity. The illusion of solidarity is only maintained on minor issues because socialists have concentrated their attention on European capital. Communal solidarity only becomes evident when Chinese capitalists face murmurs of challenge from Malays who want to supplant them.

The problem in Malaya is not only one of lack of common interests vis-a-vis foreign capital, but also one of conflicts of interests, involving not only classes, but also races. There is not only a lack of positive factors uniting all the classes and races against foreign capital, but there are also factors that make for disunity among the classes and races. The slogan borrowed from China and in a way from India fails to suit Malaya because both its assumptions are not valid.

An important basis for this disunity is to be found in the position of the Malay peasant in the economy. About 70% of the Malays are engaged in subsistence activities and are brought into the ambit of the market economy by the activities - and, in many cases, rapacious activities - of the Chinese trader. To the 2 or 3 million people involved, British capital does not constitute the exploiting group. To them, the Chinese are the exploiters. They do not distinguish between the Chinese capitalists and the rest of the community because that is a sophistication which comes only with the capacity to think outside communal terms, and is consequently, a monopoly of communists and socialists! Both the irrelevance of the European exploitation of Malaya and the identification of their own exploitation with the Chinese community, make the socialist slogan of the 'unity-of-all-races-against-European-capital' seem a hollow meaningless thing to the Malay masses. The fight of the Malays, both the peasants and those aspiring to be capitalists, is against Chinese capitalists and not against European capitalists. As long as this fight is disregarded by the socialists, and it does not matter what justification is advanced for it, the socialist movement cannot hope to find response among the Malays.

The Indian situation probably has a lesson for us in this connection. The National Congress disregarded the problem of the Muslim peasants, and the result was a communal party - the Muslim League - which gave expression to their fears and hopes and was able to mobilise them even though the Muslim League at no time held out any hopes of ending landlordism. This proves that it was futile to put forward sophisticated ideas like 'the interests of the Malay peasant and Chinese worker are identical' as long as we do nothing to show that we are immediately involved in the problems that have relevance to them. These interests will be demonstrated as being common only when socialists lead both of them against the Chinese trader. Until then, it will only be seen as a trick to establish greater control of the economy by the Chinese capitalists. Both the socialism and the non-communal character of the socialists must be patent. I would even say that the economic struggle for national unity is not the struggle

against foreign capital, as so blithely assumed by socialists, but a struggle against Chinese capital, and particularly the capital that exploits Malays directly.

The failure of socialist thinking is evident from the lack of response from the most exploited group of the population of the country, namely the Malays. Classical categories are useless for separating the blessed from the damned. We cannot fit the Malayan classes and races into the patterns that have received the imprimatur of history. If we do, then we will find that the legions of the blessed are paper legions - and paper legions don't fight. The MCP has found the truth about paper legions - at what price? It has cost the country 60,000 banishments, 10,000 dead and a general retardation of the development of a socialist movement. There may be some who will say that all this is not a big price because the political changes that have taken place are indirectly the result of the communist struggle. This is only as true as the statement that the Asian revolution is the result of the Japanese conquest of South-east Asia.

But is the failure of socialist thinking only a result of our inability to recognise that classical categories are not found here? Or has the very structure and history of socialism made it inevitable that socialists would be preoccupied with the problems of the Chinese and Indian communities? And I know that it is an unforgivable heresy to say that socialist ideas in Malaya seem to have a communal bias. But no socialist can afford to believe that thinking by Socialists always and necessarily excludes communalism. To do that would be to use doctrinal blinkers and exclude the lessons that should be derived from the troubles in East European countries. Chauvinism, and particularly great-nation chauvinism, seems to have even been a weakness of communists who owe national loyalties. How much less must be the protection that ordinary socialists have against this temptation.

I am not saying that chauvinism is something consciously adopted by socialists, though I think it would be difficult to maintain that it is entirely unconscious. There is no doubt, I think, that the emergence of China as a communist state has complicated the situation. It has become even more difficult to separate the pride in the achievements of China as an experiment of a new economic philosophy from the pride that these are the achievements of China as such. Love and loyalty to China has been transmuted into a socialist act. One might even say that to some, the very fact of being a Chinese has become a revolutionary act.

It is in this context that we must see the dangers inherent in a socialist movement that depends almost entirely for its support on the urban population. As the urban population is almost entirely Chinese or at the least predominantly Chinese, socialist movements, which cannot avoid reflecting the interests and prejudices of their memberships, will find themselves taking positions that are essentially chauvinistic. These chauvinistic positions are more difficult to attack as they are invariably

cloaked in socialist phraseology and supported by 'socialist' theories of doubtful relevance to Malaya. The most obvious example of this is the socialist attitude to the national language and to education. I do not think these can be excluded from chauvinistic influences either. In all these cases, there has been a complete neglect of the reaction of the Malays and an uncritical accommodation of Chinese interests and susceptibilities.

The idea of a multi-lingual state with communal educational systems is justified on the basis of theories like the cultural autonomy of the peoples and 'the state before the nation.' What is this cultural autonomy theory? This is supposed to be the principle accepted by the Soviet Union in solving her nationalities problem. But is it a fact that Russia accepted this principle? One has only to read the polemics of Stalin against the Bundists who had advocated the theory of cultural autonomy to realise the fallacy of the theoretical assumptions of the local 'Marxists' who accept cultural autonomy as an unquestionable truth. Cultural autonomy, meaning that diverse communities should be allowed to maintain and perpetuate cultural and linguistic differences, is pernicious because it seeks to perpetuate communal fragmentation of a country. It is pernicious because it seeks to perpetuate communal loyalties and communal politics. In Malaya, it seeks to perpetuate the separate identity of the Chinese community and their pride as members of the race of Han.

In addition to theories, Socialists are never tired of citing the example of Switzerland and a few other countries to justify their thesis. They have not, however, stopped to examine whether the historic conditions that made the development of a multi-national state in Switzerland possibly exist in Malaya. Do the Chinese and Malays live in separate cantons as the Germans, Italians, and French of Switzerland did in the period when they were making the nation? Have 20th century means of communication and modes of production made such a development impossible? One may quote the Marxist precept for what it is worth, but capitalism is the destroyer of nationalities. It destroys old nationalities by facilitating the large-scale movement of communities and their fusion with others. It creates conditions for new nationalities to come into being. Socialists advocating cultural autonomy are trying to arrest this historical process in Malaya. We are in fact doing this not only because of a complete misunderstanding of the ways in which the nationalities problem has been solved in other countries, but also because we seek to accommodate Chinese chauvinism. Garbled, the inaccurate theoretical propositions are only advanced as palliatives to those who find the inherent chauvinism unacceptable.

I can quite imagine the horror with which many socialists will view my emphasis on a common language and a common educational system as means of eliminating communal antagonisms. They will surly say that communal antagonisms are products of exploitation, and the emphasis should be on the elimination of

exploitation. To be concerned with other things is at best only chasing shadows. The unkind will say that it is diversionary, obstructionist and calculated to split the unity of the people. But the socialist presupposition that there is unity among the people is only a figment of our imagination. The task in Malaya is not the maintaining of existing unity, for it does not exist, but one of building unity. To assume that unity between the communities will arise as a natural by-product of the elimination of exploitation is to build a whole concept of national unity on the untenable assumption that there is only a single cause of disunity.

The idea that national unity automatically springs from the elimination of economic exploitation is not borne out by our experience in trade unions. In trade unions, workers have common economic interests in addition to the fact that none of the members have any exploiter-exploited relationship with one another. And yet, the effective organisation of workers is on a communal basis. Workers with common linguistic, cultural and educational backgrounds form splinter groups. This is only natural. After all, everyday relations between individuals cannot be conducted by means of simultaneous translations. Thus, in trade unions, common economic interests create a unity among all the members, but this unity is built and maintained by communal groups, whatever the nominal organisational pattern may be. In fact, the unity of many trade unions is a unity of leaders of communal groups within the union. This is not less true even in situations where some particular leaders have the support of members of all the groups. Power struggles in unions sometimes take communal overtones as they are often struggles among leaders of the communal fragments that make up the unions.

Communal politics will continue to plague this country as long as the peoples are not integrated. Cultural autonomy, by preventing this integration, is contributing to the perpetuation of communal politics. Communal politics is much more than the chauvinistic forms adopted by the Right. There are also forms that express themselves in the power arrangements in left-wing organisations. It seems axiomatic that if we want non-communal politics, we must not only work for a society in which no community, or at least no large group of one community, exploits another, but also one in which a common language and common educational background make it possible for individuals that form the society to mix freely. We must, in fact, fight the variant of communal chauvinism that lies at the core of the claim for cultural autonomy.

It may be asked how can the demand for national language be reconciled with the demand for multi-lingualism. The case for multi-lingualism has been so entangled with the theory of cultural autonomy that to many people, its validity has become dependent on this theory. There is, however, a good case for multi-lingualism as long as it is only advocated as a temporary phase in a plan for making Malay the national language. In this instance, multi-lingualism only becomes a short term expedient to

the non-Malay speaking section of the population in the political development of the country. But where it is advocated as an end in itself and something that should be a permanent feature of our society, it is only a linguistic extension of the cultural autonomy theory. Multi-lingualism has become a phoney posture for demonstrating the anti-colonial fervour of a number of local politicians. It is for socialists to save it and make it part of a programme for building a united Malayan nation.

For multi-lingualism to be valuable in the political development of the country, we must also embark on the creation of a unified educational system which will gradually have Malay as the most important medium of instruction in all the schools of Malaya. It will be the work of this educational system to replace the multi-lingual communication of ideas in the political life of the country with Malay, in due course.

The shadow of cultural autonomy on socialist thinking has not only prevented us from appreciating the transitory nature of the claim for multi-lingualism and its utilitarian purpose, but has also made us disregard the dangers of large sections of Chinese and Malay children spending very large parts of their formative years in communally separate compartments. The existence of two communal educational structures should be frightening to all those who believe that the country's future is dependent on non-communal politics. It is hypocritical to make loud pronouncements about accepting Malay as the national language when every step taken to implement this is met by loud howls of protest from socialists.

It is in the context of our acceptance of Malay as the national language and the need for amalgamating the communities that we must examine the Federation education plan. Whatever its shortcomings, maybe it is a definite step in the fulfilment of these two aims. Its main shortcoming, as far as socialists are concerned, lies in it not stating explicitly that it aims to unify the educational system so that children of different communities can go to the same schools. Its approach to the use of the educational system in building a united integrated nation is inadequate because it only seeks to unify the content of education, but not the medium of instruction. In having made this distinction, the plan has fallen victim to the claims of cultural autonomy and has strengthened the supporters of separatism. It is only logical that if different media of instruction are accepted as integral parts of the educational system of the country, the cultural autonomists would seek to give the different streams the benefits of official public examinations.

That may be logical to cultural autonomists and communalists, but I do not think it a position that socialists who believe in a unified nation can accept. In limiting public examinations to the official languages, the Alliance Government has sought to avoid the opposition that would have resulted from any direct attempt to gradually substitute Malay as the medium of



instruction in Chinese schools. But they hope that the pressure to have an education that would ultimately lead to employment opportunities that only official examinations can open up, will force the Chinese schools to change their medium of instruction to Malay or English. They seem to have expected to achieve fundamental changes in education in the country by remote stimulus, or at least with very little tears from themselves. We socialists may have no sympathy for the Alliance for not having faced up to the problem, but then neither have we! If we accept Malay as the national language, then we must at least appreciate the position of public examinations in the scheme of things. There is no doubt that it would have been much better if all those who believed that Malay should be the national language had got together to devise a plan in which the objectives and the manner in which these objectives are to be achieved were stated explicitly. Then, they could have weathered the storm of opposition from communalists together. In making such a plan, it may have been possible to look for support for its implementation from the students and teachers of Chinese schools. But such cooperation is not possible as long as the socialists are lost in the quagmire of cultural autonomy.

What is so distressing is the reactionary role that socialists are playing in the education controversy. Hiding behind pious platitudes, we are in the same camp as the communal chauvinists. Chinese right-wing leaders find, in the agitation against the Government's education policy, an opportunity for re-establishing the leadership of the Chinese community that has slipped out of their hands. But many socialists seem to look upon the unrest in the Chinese schools as an opportunity to embarrass the Alliance and to gather a few right-wing communal votes in the elections. This may be a very clever short-term tactic. But it may be just the sowing of the wind for which socialists - and for that matter, the whole country - will have to reap the whirlwind. Nobody has more to lose by hindering the integration of the communities.

It may be said that socialists are not opposed to the Education Plan and are in favour of gradually making Malay the medium of instruction in Malaya's schools. Socialists are only opposed to the inequities of not having public examinations for Chinese schools. This may appear to be an eminently reasonable attitude. It is only reasonable if the denying of official examinations adds some new disability to students in Chinese schools. That is, the denial of public examinations would shut existing opportunities of employment. This is hardly the position that faces students from Chinese schools. This problem cannot be solved by public examinations. It can only be solved by adjusting the education in these schools to the employment opportunities that exist in the country, or adjusting employment opportunities (eg, in the administrative services) to the requirements of Chinese schools. Fortunately, nobody has suggested that the administration of the country should be changed to accommodate 'the rights of cultural autonomy of the different communities,' though this is the logical solution as

long as we have communal educational systems. If, however, this solution is too absurd for even rank communalists to advocate, then there is no alternative to the creation of an educational system in which the medium of instruction is one of the official languages. It would be most desirable to make Malay the medium of instruction, but the shortage of competent teachers and satisfactory books make this a distant prospect. Probably, the changeover in Chinese schools from Chinese to Malay may have to be achieved by the temporary use of English.

This may be howled at as a 'sell-out' of the 'Asian Revolution' to the colonialists. It is nothing of the sort. It is only a recognition of the problems that face thousands of young people every year, a number that will increase year by year unless we can stop looking at it through communal spectacles. In these circumstances, to fight for public examinations may only be to tilt at windmills, except that the consequences are far from comical.

The other major problem is the form that a socialist state in Malaya will take. My view is that the fact that half the population is Malay has important implications for the form that socialism must take if it is not to engender a civil war. One of the problems of socialists in Malaya has been the impossibility of examining the case for different forms of socialism objectively. With the Emergency on, the case for communism had to be presented surreptitiously. This is not entirely disadvantageous to them. Those who challenge their case were always at the disadvantage of being accused of being unconscious instruments of the Government's psychological war. The case of democratic socialists was *prima facie* suspect. In some cases, it was even assumed that the advocates of democratic socialism were only doing so because it was a safe thing to do, or that it was being done in order to suck up to the authorities.

I have come to believe that whatever the disabilities of stating the democratic socialist case now may be, particularly from my present position, it is imperative that it must be stated - at least to my friends, so that it will indicate the nature of my thinking. I think it must also be stated by those who are in a position to state it publicly, so that the theoretical controversy among socialists can be salvaged from its present twilight existence, and it will be possible for us to hammer out a body of ideas that will suit Malayan conditions. Not to discuss will be to blunder into ideas and slogans that in the end will produce, not a society that we do not want, but no society at all.

In Malaya, the choice before us is not one of examining the different forms of socialism that have come into being, and choosing the one that appeals to us. It is not a question of weighing the efficiency of the one against the personal freedom offered by the other, and choosing what appears to be the more compelling between them. It is not a question of comparing the achievements of the Soviet Union or China against that of Britain

or India. It is not even a matter of starting from scratch by saying that poverty makes the life of our people meaningless, and demanding a system that will end all that. Our choice has to be made in the context of the peculiar problems posed by two almost equally large communities moving at different political momentums. We need a political system that will be able to draw on the energies of both these peoples. It is thus not a simple question of efficiency versus political freedom for the individual. It may have to be both.

Malays have acquired the franchise. We can only speculate on the importance (the Malay) attaches to this new right. It is the Malay vote I place importance on, because it is conceivable that the Chinese voter may be persuaded to give up the effective exercise of his right to vote on the basis that in China, everybody is so much happier and richer even though his vote has no determining effect. What is good enough for Chinese in China is surely good enough for Chinese in Malaya. But to the Malay, it may have far greater importance. It is something that has made him really important. It is something that probably appears to him to be protecting him from increasing exploitation at the hands of Chinese traders. It is something he is not going to give up easily at the blandishment of the communists, who are for him merely Chinese. Communism, to the Malay voter, is not an internationalist philosophy of the West but a Chinese idea that links the Malayan Chinese to China.

If my view of the Malay mind is right, then the only form of socialism that has any meaning for Malaya is democratic socialism. I do not for one moment believe that democratic socialism will have a fighting chance in Malaya on the basis of the peoples' concern for individual liberty. Individual liberty is too flimsy and fragile to survive against the Sputnicks and the Wai River Dam, but for the existence of a large Malay population. They are the only guarantee that democratic socialism will be given the time to effect solutions. That is, if democratic socialists value personal freedom as much as we claim to do and have the courage to get down to the task of solving the problems.

After Hungary and the revelations of the 20th Congress, we cannot brush off the complete negation of the individual which communism enforces as just another American propaganda stunt. It is something real and has to be set against the other things we want.

In the past, it seemed irrational and selfish to pose the problems of a few writers and the shootings, purges and tyranny of the Stalin regime against the achievements that have finally come to be symbolized by the Sputnicks. To those who have nothing to eat, a Sputnik civilization has more meaning than all the personal freedom that you can offer. If these were the only considerations, then many socialists would think it noble to sacrifice many things they value for the material benefits that the vast majority of the people need. Communism has proved that it is quite capable of delivering these goods.

I am convinced that in Malaya, the only possible solution is Sputniks with individual freedom, or civil war. There is a compelling reason why we must not sacrifice the things that we value. There is a compelling reason - the survival of the communities that live in this country - why we must not seek the easy route offered by communism. There is a compelling reason why we must apply ourselves to the problem of evolving the ideas and the mechanism for democratic socialism to deliver the material needs that our people want satisfied. The consequences of failure are so horrifying that we must apply ourselves to the task with the same dedication that Communists are able to bring to their work. We must do this, or our people will perish in the carnage of a civil war.

Such is the general nature of my revisionist views. It has influenced my ideas on the economic policies that will be open to socialists for some time. I am unable to see Singapore in isolation from the rest of Malaya. I see the P.A.P. success as a left-wing victory in one city in a non-socialist country. It does not mark the coming of the socialist millenium. If we do not recognise the very limited nature of the success and act with the restraint that the situation calls for, we may find that the victory is ephemeral after all. It is not only a question of British guns and warships, but an even more important determinant of our future, the reaction of the Malays in the Federation.

"Time past and time future are both contained in time present." Whatever it may be, only time can show.

**J.J.P.**

*To Wang Gung Wu from Changi Prison Camp, 1958*