By Mavis Puthucheary
The period following the Second World War was one of heightened political tensions as the Cold War divided international politics into two power blocs – left and right, communist and “the free world”. In the Far East and Southeast Asia, nationalism was on the rise against a backdrop of economic and political instability. Countries that had been under Japanese occupation seemed more vulnerable to communist influence than ever before. European prestige had been badly damaged while communism had gained a foothold with the establishment of local communist parties spearheading the nationalist movement. The Chinese Communist Party’s success in China, the Korean War and the communist penetration in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were viewed with grave concern by those who believed that other countries would also fall like dominoes to the communists. The formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was an attempt to gain multilateral cooperation in the fight against communism.
As the threat of communism spread across Southeast Asia, and security intelligence attained even greater importance, Singapore became the centre of all British intelligence activity in the Far East. According to Shaw, Singapore was also a “unique window” in Southeast Asia: the ideal place for conducting international intelligence operations:-
“In 1956 M15 described Singapore ‘as the colonial territory of vital importance to the United Kingdom in the Far East’. This importance was derived not only from Singapore’s position as a strategic base and administrative centre. Equally important were the rapid changes within Singapore’s borders which had implications for the broader conduct of British intelligence” ” ( Alexander Nicholas Shaw “The British Intelligence Community in Singapore. 1946-1959: Local Security, Regional Co-ordination and the Cold War in the Far East” Ph.d thesis University of Leeds, 2019) p. 211).
At the local level the Cold War resulted in the declaration of an emergency in Malaya and Singapore and gave the Special Branch in these territories extensive powers of detention without trial of persons suspected of being involved in communist activities. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as well as organisations linked to it such as the Anti-British League were banned. At the same time that repressive measures were taken to contain the spread of communism, there was a shift in strategy towards encouraging safe take-over political parties. It was clear that while security concerns were to be of utmost importance, there was a need to counter communist propaganda by negotiating constitutional changes that would ensure an orderly transfer of power that would be pro-British and anti-communist. Thus instead of seeing nationalism as a threat to British military and economic interests and attempting to emasculate it by repressive measures, the colonial government would allow for a greater degree of freedom of action for organizations. This inevitably resulted in the growth of local political groups including left-wing groups in Malaya and Singapore creating new problems for the security intelligence machine
In Malaya the British achieved a degree of success relatively early with the formation of the pro-British and anti-communist Alliance coalition and its success in gaining independence from the British in 1957 after winning the 1955 elections. In Singapore, however, the rise of nationalism brought about the mobilisation of leftwing forces which found expression in the creation of a large number of trade unions making decolonisation demands that threatened British security interests. Fears that the trade unions were being infiltrated by communists resulted in increasing pressures on the Special Branch to resort to repressive measures to contain the spread of communism. It also led to the involvement of the United States in Singapore affairs, something that Washington had not done before. It seems that the US was not convinced that David Marshall, the Chief Minister and leader of the Singapore Labour Front (SLF) would respond to the demands of the trade unions with the firmness that was necessary. Instead as head of an all-party delegation to the first constitutional talks in London he insisted that Singapore should be in control of internal security, something that the British stoutly refused to grant. Following the failure of the talks, Marshall resigned as Chief Minister, and was replaced by Lim Yew Hock. The United States decided that it was important to contain the spread of communism in the trade union movement by strengthening the Trade Union Congress (TUC), a conglomeration of trade unions under SLF-control and considered to be non-communist. It must be noted that Cold War tensions had split the World Federation of Trade unions (WFTU) and the formation of a new, pro-western institution, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). It was this federation that was to assist the TUC in containing the spread of communism in the trade union movement by successfully competing with the leftwing unions. S.R.Joey Long explains the strategy as follows:
“Fearing that communist gains in Singapore would trigger a domino effect and encourage communist subversion elsewhere in Southeast Asia, policy-makers in Washington decided that the United States should intervene to ‘shore up the situation’ on the island. Permitting Singapore to fall to communism was not an option as that eventuality would gravely frustrate US Cold War policies and undermine US efforts to contain communist expansion into Asia” (S.R.Joey Long “Mixed up power politics and the Cold War: the Americans, the ICFTU and Singapore’s labour movement, 1956-1960” pa328 in Journal of Southeast Asia June 2009 vol 40 no 2 pp329-351) The jury is still out on the success or failure of the ICFTU in curbing communist activities in Singapore. But what is evident is that western obsession with winning the Cold War often tended to result in nationalist demands for decolonisation being interpreted as an integral part of a world-wide communist revolution.
The Cold War paranoia was also reflected in the tendency of the security intelligence agencies including the police and Special Branch to be complacent when it came to dealing with incidents that were not related directly to communist activities. For example. An investigation into the Maria Hertogh riots in Singapore in 1952 found that:-
“There has been an imprudent atmosphere of complacency derived from the absence of active Chinese communist-inspired incidents. The whole attention of the [police] force has been focused upon potential Chinese terrorist acts to the neglect of other potentials of unrest and disorder which are equally dangerous either by themselves or by communist exacerbation or exploitation” (quoted by Shaw op cit page 158)
Much later, a similar criticism was levelled against the British intelligence community in Sarawak and Singapore for not collecting information on the activities of the North Kalimantan National Army, a militant wing of the Parti Rakyat Brunei, which was planning an insurrection in Brunei and thus not taking early action to contain the Brunei uprising in 1962 (often referred to as the Brunei Revolt. (Alexander Nicolas Shaw “British counterinsurgency in Brunei and Sarawak, 1962-1963: developing best practices in the shadow of Malaya” page 709 in Small Wars and Insurgencies). In late 1962 when the Brunei Revolt broke out, an earlier meeting between Lim Chin Siong and other leaders of the Barisan Sosialis was used as an excuse to justify their arrests in February 1963.The extent
- of Lim Chin Siong’s (and Barisan Sosialis’s) involvement in the Brunei revolt was later found to be highly exaggerated. (T.N. Harper “Lim Chin Siong and the Singapore Story” page 43 in Comet in the Sky edited by Tan Jing Quee and Jomo K.S).
Although there was no doubt that in the conflict between decolonisation and security, the Cold War security imperative governed decisions, the demands for decolonisation soon forced the British to rethink their priorities. They would be prepared to dilute their control over security intelligence provided they could transfer power to a “safe” political party which could be trusted to continue to safeguard British military and economic interests. Ironically this involved the Singapore Special Branch in political intelligence and security intelligence gathering to a greater extent than before. As British strategy shifted from one of repression towards encouraging the development of “safe” take-over political parties, inevitably this change in policy resulted in a greater degree of freedom of action for all organisations including left-wing one which increased the political aspect of the Special Branch’s responsibility.. It was felt that in the context of the Cold War “A distinction between security intelligence and political (or colonial) intelligence makes little sense. They have to be understood together as part of a dynamic relationship” (Shaw “The British Intelligence Community in Singapore 1946-1959” page 283). However, although there was little difference between political and security intelligence material, there was a distinction in the way the intelligence was to be assessed.. This distinction was not always maintained as will be demonstrated.
Singapore’s first major advance towards independence from colonial rule was the setting up of the Rendel Commission in 1953 and the promise of elections to a partially elected Legislative Assembly. The People’s Action Party (PAP) formed in November 1954, was a late comer to the political scene. Support for the party came from mix of people with different backgrounds and class, mirroring the population of Singapore as a whole but generally excluding the richer sections of the society. The protem committee consisted of a mix of English-educated professional men some trained in England, as well as trade-union leaders such as Fong Swee Suan and Devan Nair. The Secretary General of the party, the most important post in the party was held by Lee Kuan Yew, a Cambridge trained lawyer who was also the legal adviser to several trade unions. As the membership of the party was drawn from individuals and groups who may have regarded themselves as having views that were broadly speaking left-wing but who had different interpretations of what the term meant, the preparation of the PAP Manifesto was “by no means an easy task” ( S. Rajaratnam in Fong Sip Chee The PAP Story quoted in John Drysdale Singapore: Struggle for Success chapter 9 Footnote 12). However, the party held together, in its early years largely through the personality of Lee Kuan Yew who cleverly balanced the demands of the different groups. For example in the 1955 elections the PAP fielded 4 candidates, two from the professional group and two trade union leaders, Lim Chin Siong and Devan Nair. When the PAP was invited to be part of the All-party delegation to the constitutional talks in London in March 1956, Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong represented the PAP.
Although there seemed to be a willingness on the part of all individuals and groups to work together and find a modus vivendi acceptable to all, there is evidence that from the early years of the PAP Lee Kuan Yew had established contacts with the Special Branch through his close friendship with Richard Corridon, Deputy Director of the Special Branch. Lee relates how he met Corridon when he was legal adviser to Samad Ismail a journalist with a Malay newspaper, who had been arrested under the draconian Emergency Regulations. The Special Branch soon reported that Lee was not a communist and could be an important ally in the Cold War. Shaw comments that:-
“Continual reporting by the Special Branch and contacts between intelligence officers and Lee Kuan Yew from as early as 1950 ensured that British policy-makers accepted that Lee was not a communist” (Shaw op cit page 275).
Continual reporting was a two-way process. As legal adviser to several of the trade union leaders who had been detained in October 1956, Lee obtained information which he passed on to the Special Branch. This is evident from Special Branch files which read at the bottom of each page, “The particulars by the detainees as provided by their lawyer, Mr Lee Kuan Yew” (Special Branch CO 940/149 dated 8 November 1956). As Lee was not only the legal adviser but the head of the party in which many of them were members, the visits made by Lee to the Changi detention camp were also occasions for long political discussions. These visits were not supervised by the Special Branch as were visits from family members; a dispensation granted by Corridon who benefitted from the information he received from Lee.
Just two months after the PAP was formed, Lee met a senior member of the Malayan Communist Party in secret. This shows the extent to which the Special Branch trusted Lee. For there was no way Lee could have met the MCP emissary, not once but 4 times before 1959 without the Special Branch knowing and giving him permission. According to Shaw:
“In January 1955 Lee received an overture from the Malayan Communist Party which indicated they would support any anti-colonial party, which he passed to the Special Branch. This seemed to be an attempt to woo the PAP to the side of the MCP. He handed over further documents the following month.” (Shaw page 268 quoting from FCO 141/15951).
There is no way these meetings could have taken place without the knowledge and permission of the Special Branch. Lee met this representative of the MCP on four occasions before the 1959 elections and acknowledged by Lee (Battle for Merger page 28). As these meetings were held in secret, the Special Branch depended on Lee to tell them what transpired at these meetings. According to Shaw, Lee was “not averse to passing communist material on to the Special Branch and tipping them off about MCP overtures to the PAP” (Shaw op cit page 273).
It is surprising that Lee did not use these meetings to find out if any of his colleagues in detention for alleged communist activities were in fact members of the communist party. Had he done so, and was told that they were members of the MCP, he certainly would have made public this information in his radio talks in September 1961 when he tried to prove that they were communists (the radio talks were later published in Battle for Merger). Or was he unable to get the information he wanted?
The rest of this essay focusses on how British obsession with defeating communism and protecting its vital naval and military bases as well as its economic interests gave the PAP an advantage over its political rivals and helped cement British-PAP ties. In the process the PAP benefitted by using the threat of communism to improve its standing with the British. At the same time by projecting itself as an anti-colonial, leftwing party, it succeeded in gaining public support to win the City Council elections in December 1957 and the general elections in 1959. Gradually the party’s promise of achieving a democratic state with social justice was forgotten.
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The first sign of a shift in PAP policy away from its manifesto was seen during the second constitutional talks in February 1957. In the earlier talks, headed by David Marshall and in which Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong attended as representatives of the PAP, the all-party delegation rejected the proposal by the Lennox-Boyd, the British Colonial Secretary, that matters of internal security should continue to remain in British hands. With the failure of the talks, David Marshall resigned as Chief Minister and his place was taken by Lim Yew Hock, also of the Labour Party. Lim Yew Hock was much more amenable to the British demands. By this time the arrest and detention of several left-wing leaders on charges of being involved in communist-related activities who were also members of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) the highest decision-making body of the PAP, meant that the CEC was composed almost entirely with the more conservative members. When the second round of talks took place in February 1957 Lee Kuan Yew, was the sole representative of the PAP in the delegation. At these talks the British decided “that Singapore be given full internal self-government , the United Kingdom remaining responsible for external affairs and defence”. However, “since internal security and defence are inter-related, it was also decided to establish an Internal Security Council with certain powers affecting internal security” (FCO 141/14766).
The new constitution went quite far in satisfying Singapore’s aspirations for freedom from colonial rule, while at the same time making it clear that internal security would continue to be under British control. In a document especially written to assuage concerns by SEATO members that the British had moved too quickly in granting self-government to Singapore, the British government explained why independence could not be granted to Singapore either through merger with the Federation of Malaya or by itself. It stated that for “internal, political and racial reasons, Singapore would not at the same time attain independence as part of the Federation”. And “it was not practicable for Singapore by itself to have complete independence since Communist China would inevitably fill any vacuum caused by a UK withdrawal and that as long as a merger with the federation was out of reach, she would need to remain under the wing of the United Kingdom.” (“Singapore – political situation and outlook” August 1958 in CO1030/451)
The new constitution also included a clause banning “subversives” from standing as candidates in the first elections to be held under the new constitution. Although this clause was roundly condemned as undemocratic in the Singapore Legislative Assembly as undemocratic and unjust, it was made out to be an un-negotiable requirement by the British. Years later the public was told that while by both Lim Yew Hock and Lee Kuan Yew denounced the clause in public, they had privately supported it. In his memoirs Lee relates how he was invited to have tea alone with Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the chief negotiator on the British side, to discuss the possibility of inserting a clause in the Singapore act of 1958 stating that no person suspected of being involved in subversive activities shall be allowed to stand as a candidate in the 1959 elections Lee told Lennox-Boyd that while he supported the clause in private he would have to denounce it in public. (The Singapore Story page 258).
There is now evidence to prove that it was Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Yew Hock who pressed the Secretary of State to impose this ban. In a secret document entitled “Singapore: political situation and outlook” dated August 1958 the Governor of Singapore, William Goode outlines what the British requirements were for any future government of Singapore: it has “to be responsible, ready to work the new constitution and resolved to frustrate any Communist conspiracy” Lee Kuan Yew and the party he heads, will be likely to fulfil these requirements because:-
“In the first place he is signatory to the report of the 1957 conference; secondly he was a party with Lim Yew Hock in pressing the Secretary of State to impose a ban on detainees standing for elections to the first legislature of the new constitution; thirdly, although he has known that his party has always been penetrated by Communists, this has been an embarrassment to him” “Singapore: political situation and outlook” dated February 1958 FCO 141/14766 This version is slightly different from that contained in CO1030/451).
It is astonishing that the Secretary of State should have agreed to inserting this clause in the new constitution knowing full well that under the Emergency Regulations, the Special Branch had extensive powers to arrest and detain anyone merely on suspicion of being involved in communist activities. And these persons could be detained without trial for an unspecified period of time. To ban them from exercising their fundamental rights as citizens to stand for elections would have been seen as intolerable in any democratic society. It seems that the Colonial Office was influenced by the Governor of Singapore and his staff whom they regarded as best placed to form a correct judgement of the local situation. In this regard, one cannot rule out the influence of William Goode, who was Colonial Secretary (later renamed Chief Secretary) to the Governor of Singapore from 1953 to 1956 and then appointed Governor of Singapore from 1957 to 1959. Lee Kuan Yew established a close friendship with Goode during all these years. He did not agree with some of Lee’s political manoeuvrings’ and thought he was ruthless ( Greg Poulgrain “Lim Chin Siong in Britain’s Southeast Asia decolonisation in Comet in the Sky. page 121 ), but supported him especially in his dealings with the Colonial Office in London. As Governor of Singapore Goode wrote long secret letters to Alan Lennox-Boyd, appraising him of the political situation in Singapore and putting in a good word for Lee Kuan Yew. (See correspondence in FCO 141/14766. For example, in a letter to Lennox-Boyd only a few days before the 1959 general elections Goode wrote:
“In many ways I think a PAP government will be much more competent to tackle the underlying problems which face Singapore than some uneasy coalition of differing types under Lim Yew Hock [referring to the United Socialist Front that Lim was trying to put together]. The worries are in their concern to win the political battle for men’s minds against Communism, the PAP will be reckless in damaging Singapore’s economy; and the disturbingly totalitarian smell of much of the PAP’s behaviour; the interests of the party overriding all other moral issues” (C01030/451). Most of all, Goode was able to convince Lennox-Boyd that Lee and his conservatives colleagues in the CEC were actually in favour of the continuation of British presence in Singapore although “they conceive it as unavoidable in order to be consistent with the public image they have created of the PAP policies, they must continue to be highly critical of the United Kingdom in public”
The British not only colluded with Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Yew Hock to insert this clause in the new constitution but agreed to take full responsibility for it. It was therefore denounced in the Singapore Legislative Assembly and criticised for being anti-democratic by the very persons who were responsible for initiating it in the first place! Of course it was later justified by Lee Kuan Yew as a necessary tool to combat the threat of communism.
Even more telling of duplicity of the local politicians and British colonial office staff is the way the subversive clause was signed. At first it was stated that the agreement over the ban was made only between Lim Yew Hock and the Secretary of State. Then it was changed to an agreement “made between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Singapore All-Party Delegation as a whole” (Secret letter from J.R. Williams Commonwealth Relations Office to W.S. Bates UK High Commissioner in Canberra dated 11 November 1958 in CO 1030/451). A few days later Williams clarified the matter further: –
‘The Colonial Office tell(sic) me that in fact the agreement was between the Secretary of State and Lim and the Secretary of State and Lee individually. They both visited the Secretary of State separately to negotiate the agreement. The rest of the Singapore all-Party Delegation did not know of the agreement” (Letter from J. R Williams, officer in the Commonwealth Relations Office to W.S. Bates UK commissioner for Australia , dated 17 November 1958 in CO 1030/451 ).
This information raises more questions than it answers. Why was there a need to Lee and Lim to sign the Agreement individually when they both agreed to the subversive ban? Does this mean that Lee signed a different agreement from that signed by Lim? Unfortunately the agreements are missing from the file. It appears that important documents have been redacted. We shall never know under whose authority.
When the terms of the new constitution were made public, there was a mixed response. For many of the more conservative English-educated sections of the society, there was some concern over the possible loss of their relatively superior position should a left-wing party like the PAP come into power. Within the PAP there was a divergence of opinion. Some members felt that although the new constitution did not go far enough to grant full independence to Singapore, the priority was for the PAP to gain control of the fully elected government. Others were concerned that the agreement entered between the British and all-party delegation to the talks represented a shift in PAP policy and that the political leadership had not first obtained the permission of the members for the shift. It was reported that at a joint meeting attended by the Party’s Central and Branch Educational and Cultural Committees “criticisms, such as ignoring proposals from Party branches and acting in a ‘dictatorial manner’, were levelled at the Party’s Central Executive. Moreover, the committees’ Chinese journal, Action Express, was being published in defiance of a ban imposed by the Party’s non-communist leadership” (White Paper “The Communist threat in Singapore” (Cmd 33 August 23 1957 quoted in John Drysdale Singapore: Struggle for Success pp 176-177)
It seems that the grievances within the PAP were genuine. Since the arrests of Lim Chin Siong and Devan Nair, the Central Executive Committee of the PAP consisted mainly of conservative supporters of Lee Kuan Yew. It was Lee who attended the constitutional talks in London and signed the document agreeing to the continuation of internal security in British hands. At the annual party conference scheduled for August 1957 it was proposed to call for a resolution to be passed to endorse the agreement granting self-government to Singapore but also agreeing to the continuation of the internal security matters in British hands. The resolution also called on the meeting to entrust the Central Executive Committee with the task of re-organising the party and amending its constitution “with the object of strengthening party unity and solidarity in order that the approved policy of the party may be more effectively enforced” (Straits Times August 1st 1957 “Stage is set for big PAP showdown”)
It is interesting that all the7 prominent political detainees excepted Lim Chin Siong did not support the radical group. In a statement of political views sent to Lee Kuan Yew shortly after the PAP conference was held, by Fong Swee Suan, C V Devan Nair, J.J. Puthucheary, Chan Chiaw Thor, S Woodhull and Tan Boon Eng who were all in prison at the time, they said:-
“It is our view that the real reasons for the present crisis in the PAP is an inability on the part of many members of the party to appreciate the significance of the fundamental political changes that have taken place in the country, and the lack of a clear-headed understanding of the political responsibilities of socialists in this country.” And that to demand complete independence for Singapore was as stupid as “it would be for a man’s right hand to ask for independence from the rest of his body”. Appendix 10 “The Road to Socialism in an independent Malaya” in Battle for Merger page 193).
Although the majority of members were prepared to endorse the new constitution ( the resolution was carried by 1,150 votes with 112 voting against and 279 spoilt papers – Drysdale page 179), some members who were dissatisfied with the leadership decided to contest the elections for the Central Executive Council. When they won 6 seats in the 12-member CEC Lee Kuan Yew and Toh Chin Chye, the Secretary and Chairman of the party refused to take office. But before the crisis could be resolved internally, the Special Branch intervened. Within three weeks the Special Branch arrested a large number of people on suspicion of being involved in communist activities. Included in the 38 persons arrested were the 5 newly elected members of the PAP Central Executive Committee (1 resigned earlier), and 14 leaders of the PAP Educational and Cultural Committee.
There is now evidence to prove that Lee Kuan Yew worked closely with Lim Yew Hock, the Chief Minister, and the Special Branch to get rid of PAP members who disagreed with him and his colleagues. According to Cheah Boon Kheng:-
“It has been alleged and never been denied, that Lee was secretly working with the Colonial Chief Secretary, William Goode and the Chief Minister, Lim Yew Hock, to eliminate leftwing influence in his party” (‘The left-wing movement in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo in the 1960s:an era of hope or devil’s decade?” in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Vol7 no 4, p 646).
In an official document written in 1958 it was acknowledged, albeit obtrusively, that although both Lee Kuan Yew and the Chief Minister were aware “that the Communists have revived to the full their infiltration of PAP branches”, the Chief Minister :-
“at least for the moment, is not prepared for a second time to rescue Lee Kuan Yew by a purge” (Secret telegram from the Secretary of State for the colonies to the Commissioner-general dated 22 January 1958 in FCO 141/14766)).
It is also almost certain that the decision to carry out the arrests should the leadership lose ground to the group was planned even before the PAP conference was held. It is significant that three days before the PAP conference was scheduled to be held the Straits Times published an article speculating the conference was likely to produce a clash between the PAP leadership and a “powerful extremist bloc” which “will make an all-out effort to capture leadership of the party from the moderates headed by Lee Kuan Yew , the secretary, and Dr. Toh Chin Chye, the Chairman”, and that “the extremist group would use the Central Executive Committee (CEC) elections to gain a majority in the CEC, which “they hope will enable them to dictate policy from the shadows”. (Straits Times August 1st 1957).
From the language used and the way the information was nuanced to give the impression that the conflict was between a reasonable moderate leadership and an extremist group out to wreck the party, it was clear that it was a leaked document from the Special Branch. Although the group was not labelled as communists, by linking the group to the banned Singapore Factory and Shop Workers Union, a trade union alleged to have been involved in communist activities, the article indirectly associated the group with the communists. The well-used conspiracy theory that the communists will use front organisations like the PAP to further their ends was reflected in the allegation that the group was using the elections to the Central Executive Committee to “enable them to dictate policy from the shadows” (Straits Times August 1st 1957). It was therefore a small step to their arrests and detention under the Emergency Regulations.
With the arrests, Lee Kuan Yew and his colleagues succeeded in gaining and maintaining control of the party through the introduction of the cadre system. The previous party constitution which had been drafted by James Puthucheary had been based on the mass party system, similar to that in democratic countries. It provided for leaders to be elected directly or indirectly at every level of the party structure starting at the lowest or branch level. This mass party system linked the leaders to the members as the latter had control over who were elected to leadership positions in the party. In contrast the cadre system is a top-down system in which leaders are not elected by the members but by cadre members who themselves are appointed by the top leaders. There are two types of membership: ordinary members and cadre members:-
“Only cadre members would now be able to attend and vote at Party conferences. An ordinary member could not become a cadre member without the sanction of a majority vote of the Executive Committee which could suspend, demote or expel a cadre member by a two-thirds vote of the Executive. This procedure insured that ,even if the pro-Communists were able to dominate every Party branch, the Executive would still remain intact” ( John Drysdale Singapore: Struggle for Success page 203)
Although the cadre system was justified as necessary to keep the communists in the party out of positions of influence, it had the effect of keeping the top leadership more or less permanently in power. Competition for the top posts in the party could only take place within the Central Executive Committee. Unlike communist countries where cadre members are officially given appointments in the party, in Singapore cadre members are expected to keep their appointments secret. This allows the top leadership considerable flexibility in appointing and revoking cadre membership.
By restructuring the PAP to create cadre members another curious anomaly emerged: the party leadership was dominated by the English-educated while the bulk of the membership remained largely Chinese educated:
“Cadre members had to be approved by the central executive committee, which thus perpetuated the supremacy of the English-educated moderate leaders although most PAP members continued to be Chinese -educated” (M Turnbull A History of Singapore 1918-1975 page 266).
The cadre type of party structure made it impossible for a member to become a cadre member without the support of the Lee Kuan Yew and the CEC. And since only cadre members could choose the top leadership this meant that ordinary members like Lim Chin Siong were denied any opportunity to influence policy in the party unless they were appointed cadre members. The question that needs to be answered is this: were the political detainees aware of the new party constitution and the possible impact it would have on them? We do not know. Perhaps they were influenced into thinking that as the cadre system worked for communist countries it could work for Singapore as well. Perhaps they did not think that they would not be denied cadre membership. It must be remembered that they, like most members of the public were unaware of Lee’s political manoeuvrings and had confidence in him. The British were concerned about “the monolithic stater which the PAP is creating by communist methods” (CO 1036/56) but did not interfere in what it considered to be a party matter.
The restructuring of the party constitution and the subversive clause in the new constitution effectively shut out the left-wing leaders from all important decision-making bodies. This had adverse consequences for the future of democracy in Singapore Had the Special Branch not intervened and arrested the 5 recently elected CEC members in August 1957, Lee Kuan Yew and his faction would have had to work out some modus vivendi with the more radical group through negotiation and compromise. He would have to learn to be more tolerant of criticism rather than take the easy way out by dismissing constructive criticism as the work of communists conspiring to against him. In particular, the Left-wing leaders could have played an important role in bridging the gap between the conservative PAP leadership and the more radical sections of the party. The two groups had different political ideas but they had a common goal – to build up among the Chinese educated section of society a loyalty to the state of Singapore. The end result would have been not a communist take-over as feared. Instead they would work towards an effort to combat communism not by repression but by convincing the people of Singapore that democratic socialism can be effective in creating a welfare state without the rigours of communism.
Unfortunately, the Cold War narratives and the anti-Communist security machine impacted on the politics of Singapore by laying the foundation of a soft authoritarian state. Lee Kuan Yew was trained in Britain but was no democrat. He certainly did not believe that introducing the people of Singapore to the liberal values that are the hallmark of a democratic state. Using the threat of communism again, Goode is reported to have told him that although the communists were masters of the technique of getting their views and policies accepted , they were not going to have a free hand as:-
“Apart from police action, the PAP was now using similar tactics and techniques. It was no good sticking to the liberal rules practised in the United Kingdom. The only way to defeat the Communists was to use their methods of fixing meetings before they were held. It was also essential to retain the special powers of the preservation of Public Security Ordinance He was confident that the PAP could control the Communist membership of the Party; they would ensure that no communist stood as candidates for the Assembly, as they had ensured for the City Council elections, whatever the Special Branch may think to the contrary; and they would also ensure that that enough competent men were available to be Ministers.” (Goode Governor of Singapore to Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 10 October 1958 in FCO 141/4766).